


**Secret**

25X1



DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# *Central Intelligence Bulletin*

DIA and DOS review(s) completed.

**Secret**

50

22 November 1968

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A012600050001-6

Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A012600050001-6

SECRET

No. 0320/68  
22 November 1968

# *Central Intelligence Bulletin*

## CONTENTS

Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)

Rumania: New pressures appear to be building on Rumania to permit Warsaw Pact exercises on its soil. (Page 3)

Nigeria-USSR: Top civil servants are pressing the federal military to rely more on Moscow for arms. (Page 4)

Korea: North Korean infiltrators used terrorism against South Korean civilians. (Page 5)



25X1


Rumania-Jordan: Rumania will furnish economic aid to Jordan. (Page 7)



25X6

USSR-Czechoslovakia: Trade protocol (Page 9)

Communist China - Albania: Economic aid (Page 9)




25X1

Colombia-USSR: Possible aircraft purchase (Page 10)

SECRET

SECRET



92946 11-68 CIA

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

**[** Vietnam: Ground action on 20-21 November was limited to a small, two-company attack on a South Vietnamese regional outpost in the delta.

There were a number of shellings, however. Twelve rounds of 82-mm. mortar fire hit Hoi An, the capital of Quang Nam Province, on 20 November. The targets were apparently civilian. Other shellings on 20-21 November, all light and ineffective, were directed at allied military positions in Da Nang, My Tho, Pleiku city, and Binh Duong Province.

\* \* \* \*

Although President Thieu continues to enjoy widespread popular support for his stand on negotiations with the Communists, militant Buddhist leader Tri Quang has issued a public call for an immediate and unconditional cease-fire. Tri Quang, a long-time government critic, has not injected himself into South Vietnamese political issues for some months, but his remarks at this time could spark some kind of repressive action. Although the government has closed some newspapers for not supporting the "national position," it is probably moving cautiously in the case of Tri Quang in hope of preserving the current image of national unity.

\* \* \* \*

Saigon's 1969 pacification program will continue to concentrate on heavily populated areas and those near lines of communication or government administrative centers.

In addition, Saigon will try to extend its control into the countryside by improving the protection of its local officials and by increasing the involvement of technical ministries in local development. Special on-the-job training programs for local officials will be started soon by mobile training teams, and broadened responsibilities are **]**

22 Nov 68

Central Intelligence Bulletin

1

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

[being assigned to the village administrations, including greater control over the conduct of pacification and the enlarged self-help program. There is also to be an enlarged program of self-help construction of projects selected by popular assembly at the hamlet level using funds and commodities made available from the province.

The successful formulation and implementation of these plans remains a formidable task for the government, however, particularly in the face of administrative bottlenecks and fluctuating security conditions in the countryside. Moreover, while hamlet and village officials are draft-exempt, many of the colleagues to whom they must look for support at district and province level are not, and have been mobilized. In addition, although the 1969 plan is less grandiose than those of previous years, the indifference of many rural residents and the lackluster performance of many government officials could still provide stumbling blocks to these more modest goals. [REDACTED]

25X1

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

[Rumania: New pressures appear to be building on Rumania to permit joint military exercises on its soil in the not too distant future.

One official told [redacted] rest yesterday that Warsaw Pact staff officers met in Rumania on 21 and 22 November to plan a "future" exercise. He and other top officials have been highly skeptical, however, of reports that military units of the other pact states were about to enter the country. There is evidence, despite the official Rumanian calm, that some form of joint exercise may take place. On 16 November, Soviet General Shtemenko, chief of staff of the Warsaw Pact, was still in Bulgaria, and Soviet Defense Minister Grechko was reported to have been in Moldavia near the Rumanian border.

25X1

Reports of preparations for Soviet troop movements into Rumania are largely unconfirmed. Western attachés who have traveled along the Polish and Hungarian eastern borders over the last few days report no unusual troop buildups. Near the southern end of the Polish-Soviet border, however, some travel restrictions were in effect.

Soviet and other Eastern European media have stressed the need for loyalty to the Warsaw Pact but they have not singled out Bucharest for direct criticism. [redacted]

25X1

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Nigeria-USSR: Federal military authorities are reported to be under strong pressure from high-level civil servants to rely more on the Soviets for arms supplies.

The civil servants apparently are dissatisfied with the slow progress of the war and delays in arms shipments from the UK. They are urging federal leader Gowon to request immediate delivery from the USSR of "all types" of military equipment.

25X1

The USSR has already delivered a considerable amount of materiel to Nigeria, including some 25 MIGs. Gowon has preferred to rely primarily on the UK and other Western European countries, but he might succumb to pressure for more Soviet arms aid unless federal forces are able to break quickly the current military stalemate. The pressure on Gowon is made all the heavier because the federal authorities apparently believe that unless the war is won soon, the French will grant diplomatic recognition to Biafra and intervene directly in behalf of the secessionists.

Yesterday, the USSR and Nigeria signed a long-term economic and technical cooperation agreement. The Soviet delegation that signed the agreement reportedly said that the federal government has approved the establishment of a Soviet consulate in the North-Central State and the assignment of Soviet cultural officers to three northern cities.

25X1

~~SECRET~~



SECRET

Korea: North Korea appears to have added calculated terrorism against the civilian population to its operations against the South.

The recent landings on South Korea's east coast by North Korean guerrilla teams have been followed by numerous reports of murder, abduction, and plunder committed against local villagers. On 20 November, a member of the civilian militia returned home to find all five members of his family, including two small children, stabbed to death.

Two captured infiltrators have confirmed that one of their assignments was to test the feasibility of establishing bases for future guerrilla operations in the South. Contrary to North Korean propaganda claims of a popular uprising in the area of the landings, there have been no reports of South Korean civilian cooperation with the infiltrators. Many South Koreans have risked their lives to notify the authorities of the intruders' presence. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

25X1

SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A012600050001-6

Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A012600050001-6

SECRET

Rumania-Jordan: Rumania has entered the economic aid field in Jordan.

Under a ten-year economic and technical aid agreement signed on 20 November, the Rumanians will prospect for oil east of the Jordan River. Rumania also will provide equipment and technical assistance for geological and oil prospecting to be undertaken by Jordan. Unlike the recent oil exploration agreement with Yugoslavia, which does not provide for any payment until oil is found, Rumania will be paid for its services whether or not the prospecting is successful.

Rumania also is to supply Jordan with equipment and technology for the construction of power stations and fertilizer, superphosphate, and mineral plants. Jordan is to pay with exports of phosphates and other minerals. Although the announcement did not mention credit arrangements, a Jordanian official stated last May that the agreement would provide for credits.

[REDACTED]

25X1

SECRET

25X6

Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A012600050001-6

Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A012600050001-6

SECRET

NOTES

25X1 USSR-Czechoslovakia: The Soviet-Czechoslovak trade protocol for 1969, signed on Wednesday, will permit an increase in the already substantial dependence of the Czechoslovak economy on the USSR. The agreement provides for a volume of trade of approximately \$2.2 billion, ten percent above this year's planned level. The USSR agreed to increase deliveries of foodstuffs and raw materials, including petroleum products, natural gas, iron ore, and coal. More than one half of Czechoslovak exports to the USSR will consist of machinery and equipment. [REDACTED]

\* \* \* \*

25X1 Communist China - Albania: Peking is providing additional economic assistance to Albania, probably as a demonstration of support in the face of Moscow's hardening attitude toward Eastern European dissidents. An agreement signed on 20 November apparently includes a new credit for technical assistance and whole plants, as well as machinery, equipment, and ships. Protocols on trade and on Albania's use of outstanding Chinese credits next year also were signed. Previous Chinese economic aid consists of at least \$125 million for Albania's third five year plan (1961-65) and an unannounced amount extended in 1965 for the fourth plan. [REDACTED]

\* \* \* \*



25X1

22 Nov 68

Central Intelligence Bulletin

9

SECRET

SECRET

Colombia-USSR: The Lleras government reportedly is again considering the purchase of civil aircraft from the USSR. [REDACTED] the five turboprop aircraft under consideration would be assigned to a domestic airline operated chiefly for civic action by the Colombian Air Force. The aircraft may be demonstrated in Bogota next month. Opposition by air force officers may have been the main reason that serious Colombian consideration of Soviet aircraft in the past two years has not resulted in sales. This opposition could be overruled by foreign exchange considerations favoring the use of the bilateral trading account with the USSR and thereby possibly promoting coffee sales.

[REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

SECRET

**Secret** Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A012600050001-6

**Secret**

Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A012600050001-6